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Abstract 
The paper shows that credit rationing is not exercised through transaction 
costs in Togo rural credit unions, as is the case in other financial institutions. Rules 
of proportionality between deposit holdings and loan amounts determine loan size, 
while risk-related factors influence the level of borrower transaction costs. 
1. Introduction 
THEDE~DFORFUNDSFROM 
RURAL CREDIT UNIONS IN TOGO 
This paper analyzes the demand for funds by rural borrowers in the semi-
formal institutional framework of a credit union movement. In this framework, loans 
supplied by the financial institution are allocated among borrowers according to a 
rationing mechanism which involves several instruments. The objective .of the study 
is to analyze the extent to which price components influence credit allocation in 
credit unions and to highlight the factors that help resolve asymmetric information 
problems. 
Transaction costs, as a part of the total price of funds, have been identified 
as a primary factor in borrowing decisions (Adams and Nehman). They represent 
the additional costs imposed on borrowers by lenders beyond interest charges which 
play the role of a rationing instrument, particularly in the presence of interest-rate 
restrictions. However, it is not clear whether under the credit union non-profit and 
democratic operational mechanisms transactions costs are used as a rationing 
instrument in the credit allocation process. This paper addresses this question using 
a simultaneous equations system involving a price equation and a demand for funds 
equation. In this model, transaction costs and loan amounts are tested for the 
validity of their classification as endogenous variables. Moreover, the explanatory 
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variables in the system will shed some light on the significant factors and principles 
by which credit unions operate. 
A baseline study of the Togo credit union movement in 1987, which involved 
395 rural household interviews, provided the data used to test the model (Cuevas, 
1987). A total of 137 observations representing farmer-borrowers who had access 
to credit union loans, are used as the data base for analysis. 
The next section provides a review of the factors explaining the demand for 
and cost of funds and specifies the simultaneous-equations model. The specification 
test is discussed in section 3. The last section presents the empirical results, 
implications, and conclusions of the study. 
2. The Model 
Farmer-borrowers' attitude and specifically rural credit union members' 
behavior are described using a cost minimization approach. Borrowers seek to 
minimize the cost of a loan subject to the constraints of investment and consumption 
opportunities. The total loan price (W) can be defined in an identity relating 
transaction costs (TC) and the explicit-interest rate charged on the loan (i) as: 
W=TC+i (1) 
Farm. production (Q) is a function of three factors. First is the aggregate 
measure of assets (AST) that represents the borrower's resource endowment 
available to generate output; this includes farm area, animal. stock and machinery. 
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Second is family size (F) which is used as a proxy for labor needed to generate 
output, and third is depository holdings (D), a proxy for working capital needed in 
production. This is represented as follows: 
Q=f(AST ,F ,D) (2) 
Consumption preferences are determined by family size (F) and income level 
(Y) which reflects potential consumption patterns. Defining (C) as the level of 
consumption, a functional form can be written as: 
C=g(F,Y) (3) 
Both production and consumption constraints, (2) and (3), can be relaxed 
through borrowed funds (L). For credit union members, two determinant factors 
explaining variations in loan demand directly are depository holdings (D) and years 
of membership in the credit union (N). First, consideration of depository holdings 
can be regarded as a competitive source of liquidty, or as a complementary factor 
when considered as initial capital, and a positive element for getting access to credit. 
Second, increased credibility can be associated with the number of years of 
membership in the Coopec (N). Hence, (L) can be written as a function of (D, N) 
and is added to (2) and (3) as an additional factor input. A cost minimization 
problem is set up as: 
Min WL = [i + TC] *L(D,N) (4) 
st Q = f(AST, F,D,L(D,N)) 
C = g(F, Y, L(D,N)) 
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(5) 
(6) 
Specifing a lagrangian function and taking first order derivative with respect 
to the decision variable (L), the demand for loans can be derived as a function of: 
L=L(TC,i,AST ,F,Y,D,N) (7) 
Total borrowing costs have been defined to include the nominal interest 
payments charged by the lender, non-interest transaction costs incurred by the 
borrower, and changes in the purchasing power of money over the loan period 
(Adams and Nehman). Interest rate ceilings and other restrictive policies lead 
lenders to use the alternative of exercising credit rationing through transaction costs 
which becomes a primary factor in the borrowing decision. Transaction costs can be 
identified as all the non-interest expenses incurred in association with obtaining and 
repaying the loan. These costs include explicit costs such as travel and other cash 
expenses, and the opportunity cost of time involved in securing and repaying the 
loan. 
Transaction costs which are implicit price variations, can be explained to a 
large extent by the borrowers' different risk characteristics. A group of proxy 
variables for risks includes area of the farm, deposit holdings, and loan amount. 
Again the number of years of membership can be a determinant of transaction costs. 
A framework including all of the various dimensions of transaction costs discussed 
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above can now be specified in a supply price equation. 
It has been argued that under a price-setting framework, the specification of 
the loan amount as an exogenous variable in the transaction costs equation is 
questionable (Cuevas and Graham). Considering this loan amount as a point on the 
borrower's demand for funds and assuming that borrowers consider transaction costs 
as a part of the loan price, a model is specified as a simultaneous equation system 
in which transaction costs and loan amounts are endogenous variables. Although this 
endogenous justification might hold for some financial institutions, it might be less 
likely in the case of credit unions, since in these institutions the loan amount appears 
to be determined primarily by the borrower's deposit holdings at the credit unions. 
The elements that determine transaction costs are captured by the explicit-interest 
rate (i), a group of proxy variables for risk such as loan amount (L), farm area (A), 
deposit holdings (D), and (N) denoting number of years of membership. Hence, the 
model can be written, in log form, as follows: 
lnTC=a1lni+ainL+a3lnA +ainD+a5lnN (8) 
lnL=b1lni+b2lnTC+b3lnAST+b4lnD+b5lnY+binF+b1lnN (9) 
Under the simultaneity assumption, with over identified equations, Three 
Stage Least Squares should give the most efficient estimates. However, to test the 
appropriateness of the simultaneous-equation specification an exogeneity test is 
carried out to verify if transaction costs and loan amount are indeed endogenous 
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variables. 
3. Specification Test 
Hausman's specification error test is implemented as an exogeneity test and 
is carried out as follows (Maddala). First, the endogenous variables in the 
simultaneous equations system are each repressed on all the instruments in the 
system, i.e., estimating : 
lnTC = f(lni, InA, lnAST, lnD, lnF, lnY, InN) 
lnL = f(lni, InA, lnAST, lnD, lnF, lnY, InN) 
Second, each of the regression equations is expanded by adding the corresponding 
predicted value of the endogenous variables (lni'c) and (lnL) as additional 
explanatory variables, and Ordinary Least Squares (Ol.S) is used to estimate the 
modified equations: 
lnTC=f(lni,lnL,lnL,ln.A,lnD,lnN) 
lnL=f(lni,lnTC,lnTc,ln.AST,lnD ,lnY,lnF,lnN) 
The third step is to test the significance of the coefficient of the predicted variables 
on the right-hand side of the equations, i.e. the null hypothesis that the coefficient 
of the predicted endogenous variable equals zero in each of the regression equations. 
This test indicates the endogeneity or exogeneity of these variables. 
The test presented in table 1 rejects the hypothesis of significant endogenous 
variables in the system. This implies that the reduced forms do not have explanatory 
power beyond that contributed by the explanatory variables of the structural 
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equations and, therefore, a simultaneous equations technique is not justified. Thus, 
the OLS estimation is sufficient to generate consistent and most efficient estimates. 
This result is not surprising in a credit union where transaction costs are not 
necessarily a rationing mechanism imposed by the lender but instead they are largely 
due to the borrower's value of time spent in obtaining the loan. Another plausible 
explanation is the fact that borrowers are credit union members, i.e. they have a vote 
in the loan decision making process and access to revealed information concerning 
borrowers' creditworthiness. 
4. Results and Implications 
The results presented in Table 2 corresponding to the OLS estimation show 
acceptable levels of R-square for samples of cross-sectional data. Individual 
variables are likely to be correlated among themselves; therefore, statistical tests 
were carried out to check the significance of the group of variables for risk, total 
prices, and consumption effects. Analysing the determinants of transaction costs in 
Table 2, it is estimated that the loan amount is significant in increasing the price of 
the loan. Farm area, which is one of the proxies for risk, is also significant and has 
the expected negative relationship with transaction costs; costs decrease the less risky 
the prospective borrower appears to be. Depository holdings as a proxy for risk does 
have the expected sign but is not significant. The group of variables representing 
risk proves to be a significant source explaining variations in transaction costs; this 
finding implies that the length of time required to obtain a loan increases as the 
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perceived risk associated with the prospective borrower increases. The number of 
years of membership does not contribute as a significant explanatory source of 
variations in transaction costs. The implication is that information is revealed upon 
joining the group during the same period of time, and that new members are not at 
a disadvantage or subject to more difficult processing of loans. Although interest 
rate has the expected sign, it is statistically insignificant. This is not surprising 
considering the very low rates charged on loans in the credit unions and the lack of 
variation among them as recognized from the data. With a zero profit objective, the 
credit union is presumably breaking even by earning enough on loans to pay the 
returns on deposits and maintaining a flow of circulating liquidity in the community. 
The loan demand equation shows a positive relation between loan amounts 
and total prices (w). This is not a rational demand behavior as it implies a positive 
own-price elasticity. Nevertheless, under the prevailing conditions in rural areas, it 
is likely that higher costs imply simply more time involved in obtaining larger loans; 
with low interest rates, the transaction costs component of the price dominates and 
yields an overall positive relation. Moreover, this rationale is supported by noting 
that the transaction costs part of the total price is a significant variable, and has a 
positive relationship with the loan amount. The variable for investment opportuni-
ties (AST) performs poorly and is insignificant although it has the expected sign. 
Family size (F) has a significant coefficient and reflects the expected substitution of 
family labor for hired labor which implies reduced cash expenses and hence reduced 
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demand for borrowed funds. Deposit holdings (D) is highly significant and has a 
positive relationship with loan amounts which is the typical behavior observed in 
credit unions; the loan to deposit ratio or multiplier is approximately two. 
Consumption preferences proxied by family size and income level are a significant 
category. Income as a measure of future consumption is a significant factor and 
reflects the expected relationship, it is increased with an increase in loans. The 
number of years of membership does not contribute significantly in explaining 
variations in loans demanded, implying no effective rationing of new members. 
The findings reported above indicate that in credit unions rationing cannot 
be assumed to be exercised through transaction costs, nor that this instrument is an 
endogenous factor in the borrower's loan demand function. Risk related factors do 
have a significant role in determining transaction costs. This result suggests that 
although there exists trust among members, they still do consider the riskiness of the 
borrowers as an important factor in determining loan procedures. Specifically, 
deposit holdings are considered as a collateral substitute and an indication of 
repayment ability. Furthermore, the results suggest that in credit unions transaction 
costs and loan price do not play the rationing role they play in other lending 
institutions. 
The close relationships in rural communities provide direct access to 
information indicating an individual's creditworthiness which is a natural resolution 
for credit allocation problems. On the other hand, the credit union established rules 
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of proportionality between deposit holding and loan amounts appear to dominate the 
factors determining loan size. 
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Table 1. Estimated Parameters of the Exogeneity Test (OLS) 
Transaction Costs Loan Amount 
Explanatory 
(lnTC) (lnL) 
Variables Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio 
Loan Amount (lnL) 0.211 2.272"' 
- predicted (lnL) -0.247 -0.979 
Transaction Costs 0.456 2.252"' 
(lnTC) 
- predicted (lnTC) -0.040 -0.049 
Interest Rate (lni) 0.064 -0.567 0.021 0.115 
Area of the Farm -0.156 -1.828° 
(InA) 
Deposit Holdings 0.046 0.318 0.504 4.769"' 
(lnD) 
Assets (lnAST) 0.024 0.422 
Family Size (lnF) -0.171 ~0.736 
Income Level (ln Y) 0.245 2.666* 
Years of -0.019 -0.150 -0.256 -1.514+ 
Membership (N) 
Intercept 7.518 5.889"' -0.714 -0.123 
R2 0.174 0.555 
Test F-value 
HO: predicted = 0 1.753 7.472"' 
N =56· 
' Significance levels: * = 1 percent 
+ = 5 percent 
0 = 10 percent 
Table 2. Estimated Parameters of the Transaction-Costs 
and the Loan-Demand Equations (OLS) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Loan Amount (lnL) 
Transaction Costs 
(lnTC) 
Interest Rate (lni) 
Area of the Farm 
(InA) 
Deposit Holdings 
(lnD) 
Assets (lnAST) 
Family Size (lnF) 
Income Level (In Y) 
Years of Membership 
(N) 
Intercept 
F-Value 
N = 60; 
Significance levels : 
Transaction Costs 
(lnTC) 
Estimate 
0.148 
0.054 
-0.186 
-0.075 
0.037 
6.865 
0.139 
1.776 
* = 1 percent 
+ = 5 percent 
0 = 10 percent 
t-ratio 
1.838+ 
0.485 
-2.301 * 
-0.943 
0.329 
8.724* 
Loan Amount 
(lnL) 
Estimate 
0.594 
-0.044 
0537 
0.017 
-0.293 
0.192 
-0.168 
-1.310 
0.503 
10.254 
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3.741* 
-0.282 
5.759* 
0.313 
-1.639+ 
2.592* 
1.166 
-0.775 
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